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From Land Rights to Sovereignty: 
Curious Parallels Between Alaska and Canadian Indigenous Peoples 
Both Alaska Natives and aboriginal peoples of Canada have been late bloomers 
in securement of land claims based on aboriginal title and its extinguishment. 
Although the reasons for this delay relate to the discrete development of Indian 
policy in each country, both indigenous groups now find themselves seeking explicit 
governmental validation of governmental authority to regulate these same domains. 
Despite the juridical premise that only aboriginal groups capable of controlling land 
have aboriginal claims to cede and/or extinguish, modern groups in each place must 
secure federal confirmation of their sovereign powers. The barriers are similar and 
so are the strategies employed. The author suggests a close comparative 
examination of problems and opportunities. 
For indigenous peoples of Alaska and Canada, more than similar physical 
environments predispose them to study the ever changing legal environment in their 
respective countries. Each group struggles within the context of a modern federal 
system to seek explicit governmental validation of rights long considered to be at the 
heart of its way of life. 
Each seeks firm commitments from its national government that its traditional 
uses of land will continue into the future and that the group will have a meaningful 
role in management of the land and resources and of its own affairs. For each group 
the legal basis for negotiation is only now becoming clear. For each group 
fundamental questions of ownership and governmental authority have been left long 
unresolved. This is in sharp contrast to Indians in the rest of the United States where 
both statute and court decisions have long ago formed a frame of reference which set 
the outer limits to land and governmental control by tribes. 
Alaska Indians, Eskimo and Aleut peoples and Canadian Indian, Eskimo and 
Metis appear to have been left behind when their situations are compared with the 
sweep oflndian policy which flowed from the early Crown policy developed for North 
America to secure land and trade monopolies and to remove original occupants from 
new frontiers. That Indian policy, most clearly articulated in what Alaskans term 
"the lower 48" states, carried forward as an attribute of federal policy an ultimate 
constitutionally-grounded national monopoly over Native lands and Native 
communities. Rooted in early decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
Congress was said to have plenary authority over extinguishment of aboriginal 
rights to use and occupancy of land. As an attribute of that same process, a process 
that masked a continuing struggle between national and state authorities, American 
Indian groups were deemed to have continuing sovereignty over their people, subject 
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only to a process of removal and reallocation of authority to the federal and state 
governments by the Congress (Wilkinson, 1982). 
The impetus of Indian policy in the lower 48 was initially an effort to control 
pressures along the national frontier. Indians were protected until they could be 
assimilated into the national citizenry. Placed on lands reserved for them, lands 
which replaced vast areas used for hunting and gathering activities held under 
aboriginal title, they were clustered into reservation colonies. While judicial lip 
service and relative legislative indifference allowed tribal governments to use their 
residual sovereignty, what was actually implemented was a camouflaged American 
colonial policy. Overtly, this policy stressed in its every permutation a formula of 
«doing right" for indigenous peoples. In fact, Indians were used as pawns to hold vast 
federal acreages off the private market and out of state hands. This use of Indians to 
hold in place federal land acreage, a policy that preceded development of a strong 
national parks policy, was coupled with a policy to limit introduction of a state legal 
presence on these same lands. Periods of breakup of the tribal land mass, the 19th 
century allotment period being the best example, or reassertion of federal authority 
as tribal authority under the guise of the Indian Reorganization Act (United States 
Congress, 1934), with repurchase of some lands lost during the allotment period, are 
best understood as ebbs and flows in the continuing struggle between states and the 
national government over public lands with Indians and their residual sovereignty a 
matter of rather secondary interest and effect. 
The obligation of some government to provide for indigenous peoples, stripped of 
their own economic sustenance and transformed into welfare societies, was often a 
strong motivator for state governments to defer to federal-tribal arrangements. So 
were generous private leasing programs of tribal lands. When Congress offered the 
option to many states to take up criminal and civil law jurisdiction without reduction 
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of the tribal land base in the late 1950s, many states determined that the net outflow 
of tax revenues did not warrant the assumption of jurisdiction, this in the era when 
Congress unilaterally terminated federal relations with many tribes. 
These same states may well have had second thoughts about the trade-off 
implicit in delivery of state services for natural resources found on Indian lands by 
the end of the termination era. However, Indian law advocates had by the late 1960s 
staked out and confirmed Congressional preemptive authority and tribal authority to 
tax and regulate tribal land in an era of "self-determination without termination." 
In recent years Indians have been able to reach beyond reservation boundaries 
and reassert treaty rights to fish, water and even ownership of land traded away 
without federal approval. However, the advantages of "lower 48" Indians, rooted in 
trust territory granted through treaties after extinguishment of aboriginal title, 
territory which clearly demarcated geographic jurisdiction of invigorated tribal 
governments, may have also set in place permanent constraints on social change and 
social improvement, even on Indian tribal terms. 
Alaska Natives and Canadian Aboriginal people entered the late twentieth 
century with much less legal groundwork established through case law or through 
legislation. 
Alaska Natives had signed no treaties. Although they laid claim to virtually 
the entirety of Alaska through use and occupancy-subsistence activities which they 
vigorously pursued from village staging areas, the Congress had not taken upon itself 
to settle their land rights. In the treaty of purchase from Russia and in successive 
Organic Acts which created a civil governmental structure in the federal territory, 
the issue of confirmed Native land rights was held in abeyance (Case, 1984). In 
Canada the treaty process moved across the continent and replaced Native title with 
reserves.I Yet it remained unclear whether aboriginal title existed among 
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indigenous groups in the Western states until the 1970s. In the Northwest Territory 
little was accomplished. Further, even where aboriginal title was said to exist, it was 
viewed as something less than a legal right, characterized as a personal and 
usufructuary interest. Once this Indian interest was removed, Crown land became 
provincial land in its entirety and not federal land as in the United States. 
In the matter of land rights, history, either legal or political, provided few clues 
for Northern peoples of Canada or for Native Alaskans as to the level of control they 
would enjoy over the lands they used for survival and participation in the cash 
economy. In neither place did frontier pressures or prospects for statehood or 
provincial status set in motion a determined early legal or political need to protect 
Native land rights, define Native land rights or even use Native land rights as a 
stalking horse in a battle for federal jurisdictional authority. Belatedly, Canadian 
Eskimos were said to be legally "Indians." Belatedly, they were confirmed as capable 
of holding land by aboriginal title. 
In Alaska, while aboriginal title settlements were delayed, aboriginal rights 
were lost. In Tee-Hit-Ton (1955) the Supreme Court determined that those rights 
lost were not property rights of legal significance, subject to compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment. Some areas within the vast federal domain were demarcated for 
Alaska Native use by the Executive Branch, but only one classic Indian reserve was 
established by Congress, this for a group of migrating Canadian Indians. 
The concept of inherent tribal sovereignty, employed by Justice Marshall in the 
earliest days of the United States as a weapon to avoid state legal assimilation of 
Indian communities and their lands, did not evolve from Indian-Canadian relations 
in Canada even when they were marked by treaty relations. Neither was the concept 
of federal trust responsibility a product of Canadian Indian policy, in the sense that 
aggrieved tribes could sue for violations of it when it was fleshed out by the 
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parliament until this decade.2 Only in the 1980s did an abuse of Indian property 
rights by the federal bureaucracy provide a glimmering of the historical American 
Indian remedy against legislative commitments made but left unimplemented. In 
Alaska, also, tribal sovereignty existed as a de facto matter but remained 
unconfirmed by the courts as a secured tribal right and basis for negotiation. 
One can argue that the concept of tribal sovereignty had less utility in Canada 
and in Alaska than elsewhere in North America. The Canadians employed Indian 
Act band governments as instruments of tutelage. The federal government in Alaska 
deployed teacher-missionaries to guide Native villages into Western civilization. 
Neither were as concerned with using the concept of tribal sovereignty to create a 
buffer between Indian Country and settlers who would establish a state. In the 
Canadian North, resettlement programs of the 1950s reorganized Native 
communities to befit service requirements, especially education of the young. In both 
places it would appear that heavy-handed colonial policies assumed that traditional 
tribal authority was buried under developed plans for municipal style Native 
government equipped with minimal, delegated authority (Conn, 1985). Although 
studies in Alaska demonstrate that traditional governments simply assumed 
whatever shape was required and continued as an active force, this little concerned 
federal or even state administrators. This kind of unacknowledged, de facto tribal 
sovereignty challenged no other sovereign on ultimate land and resource issues. In 
both Canada and Alaska, federal and provincial governments occupied the field. 
States and Provinces 
The developed tensions between states and Indian tribes so often viewed as the 
primary reason for ultimate federal initiatives in "lower 48" Indian affairs was not so 
evident in Alaska or in Canada although the reasons varied. As a legal matter, the - 5 -
American doctrine that suggested state law of general application applied to Indian 
country only as allowed by the Congress was turned on its head in Canada. 
Provincial law applied to Indians, even Indians on band reserves, unless a federal 
conflict arose or the law singled out Indians or Indian property. Alaska remained a 
federal territory until 1959. After that, state law replaced federal law as the single 
official expression of civil and criminal law in Indian country. What villagers chose 
to do among themselves was accepted as a de facto matter and even encouraged, but 
never sanctioned (See Conn and Hippler, 1975). 
In short, the late twentieth century left a bemusing picture for Indian law 
practitioners in both Alaska and Canada, schooled as they were on the root American 
Marshellian notions that Indian law meant aboriginal title transformed into land 
held in federal trust, peopled by persons with acknowledged sovereignty and subject 
to (or protected by) a judicially enforceable federal trust relationship. 
Little of this legal foundation material had been laid in Canada or in Alaska. In 
the main, land rights remained to be settled. Federal obligations (as opposed to 
federal charity) were unclear and tribal sovereignty uncertain and unacknowledged. 
At risk in both places were aboriginal ways of life guided by trapping and subsistence 
cultures that gave meaning and even social order to many Native communities. 
These subsistence cultures were more than an economic force and the closest thing to 
a vehicle for continuing community self-definition. 
If the early 1980s are employed as a moment in time to stop the action and view 
significant events on the Alaskan and Canadian sides of the border, what parallels 
emerge? 
Inuit Alaskans had responded to threats to bowhead whaling by linking their 
cause to Inuit in other circumpolar countries. Under the visionary leadership of Eben 
Hopson, they had created the Inuit Circumpolar C_onference to view globally a range 
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of shared political and social issues. Other Alaska Native leaders and many villagers 
had been lulled into one of two distinctly parochial assumptions about their present 
and future. One side viewed Alaska as unique among American Indian legal 
cultures. The "Alaska is different" syndrome had as its cornerstone the landmark 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (or AN CSA) of 1971. Spurred by a desire to 
construct the TransAlaska Pipeline over land to which Natives made aboriginal 
claims and by Alaska's desire to select from federal lands the state's share, oil 
companies and the state made common cause with Natives to secure a Congressional 
settlement of unlitigated claims. The settlement extinguished all contested Native 
claims and, as an ultimate irony, expressly extinguished aboriginal hunting and 
fishing rights that formed the basis of those claims. The difference between this 
settlement and historical treaty (or legislative) settlements was profound. Tribes 
were not party to the settlement. Natives then living were enrolled and made 
shareholders in village and regional corporations which received 44 million acres of 
land along with a cash settlement from the federal government and the state's oil 
wealth. A new village institution, a for-profit corporation established under state 
law, arose to receive surface estates surrounding the villages. The village core went 
to state chartered municipalities with individual homesites to current residents, 
Native and non-Native alike. Federal trust protections did not follow the land with 
this settlement. The conveyed land was immediately treated as a corporate asset. 
The stock was made subject to alienation in twenty years. Subsistence protection was 
left for later resolution. 
This profound experiment in self-determination set Alaska Natives apart from 
all other American Indians. Many Natives thought of themselves as different from 
American Indians although the Congress had used its Indian law authority to pass 
the act. 
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Alaska's settlement was followed by persistent debate and successive 
amendments of ANCSA by the Congress. These amendments resulted in new 
constraints on stock alienation, subject to removal by Native stockholders, and 
permanent protections for undeveloped land f rom taxation or other external 
attachment unless boards of directors, themselves, put the land at risk. These "1991 
amendments" made Alaska Natives the apparent masters of their own destiny. 
The fundamental premises of ANCSA were not redefined by Congress as it 
amended the act.· A corporate settlement with land treated as non-trust real estate 
remained at the heart of the arrangement. Village tribes, assuming they existed, 
were not parties to the arrangement. 
Advocates of the corporate, "Alaska is different" model were joined in debates 
over Congressional amendments by a second faction who looked at "lower 48" tribal 
rights as a source of ultimate protection. They were motivated by corporate 
bankruptcy, selective examples of land loss, but also by coalitions of villages who saw 
traditional controls of community life, especially subsistence, slipping away. The act 
may or may not have been terminationist in intent. However, reductions in levels of 
federal support for Alaska Natives and an increased presence of state-guided 
activities in rural Alaska suggested that village life con trolled by Na ti ves would be a 
victim of patterns of governance, if not direct Congressional edict. 
Canadian jurist Thomas Berger found serious flaws at the heart of the act 
(Berger, 1985, 1988). Others noted that even federal monies earmarked for Alaska 
Natives as Indians passed through nontribal, non-profit regional corporations. 
Village Natives became increasingly disempowered and tribes were threatened by 
their lack of involvement in governmental activities around them as much as by still 
uncertain legal acknowledgment (Conn and Garber, 1981). 
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The heart of what Berger discovered in his many Alaska hearings was concern 
by residents that subsistence estates were no longer owned by villages. Berger 
understood, as many who had advocated the corporate model did not, that subsistence 
defined rural Native life. It gave purpose to Alaska villages and provided the inner 
logic of Native tribal identity. Now much of the land on which subsistence occurred 
was state or federal and not Native. 
Congress finally had not ignored traditional and customary subsistence. 
Lengthy hearings had established its fundamental rationale as a source of the Native 
way of life (Conn and Garber, 1989). Yet it also had not abandoned the logic of 
AN CSA, especially the substantial role of state involvement. 
In the Alaska National Interest Land and Conservation Act (ANILCA), a 
second piece of major legislation, it created a vast national park system (U.S. 
Congress, 1980). ANILCA offered the state of Alaska the opportunity to direct the 
management of fish and wildlife on federal and state lands so long as it gave a 
priority to traditional and customary subsistence among "rural Alaskans," subject 
only to conservation of the resources. Thus, Alaska Native villages not only lost their 
traditional land base for subsistence, but lost direct control over it. 
Tribal advocates sought renewed Congressional affirmation of village 
sovereignty. Proposed strategies ranged from legal control of the village core to areas 
where subsistence took place. The state, sensing that it had eliminated a 
fundamental attribute of fixing the dimensions of sovereignty - geographical 
jurisdiction, fought tribal advocates at every turn. Even in matters where political 
logic would suggest that a partnership between village tribes and the state would 
insure availability of services and a continuing flow of federal dollars for Alaska 
Natives as American Indians, the state persisted. State lawyers directly challenged 
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the historical reality of tribes, even in the face of federal court rulings that Congress 
must expressly terminate aboriginal sovereign rights (Miller, 1989). 
What Alaskans Discovered 
In Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland (1977), Berger had presented 
Canadians with a vision of Native self-determination which well stated aspirations of 
Dene and Inuit peoples (among others) on both sides of the border. Because he 
addressed the situation of aboriginal peoples in a territory with some leverage over 
the political process because of the anticipated natural gas pipeline, unresolved 
aboriginal claims and treaty rights and the absence of direct provincial involvement, 
he could project a visionary settlement which met the full spectrum of aboriginal 
needs. That vision, a recapitulation of the testimony of territorial residents, 
foreshadowed the testimony of Native Alaskans about ANCSA several years later. 
What was desired, he suggested, was more than a settlement for a corporate land 
base and compensation (as in Alaska) and more than delegated governmental 
authority. Berger explicitly rejected both the ANCSA-style settlement and that of 
the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975). His informants desired 
governmental control over their resource base, guided by their own political 
institutions, centered on a hunting, fishing and trapping economy. He envisioned 
that such a settlement would place in Native hands collective control of the land and 
at least partial control over exploitation of non-renewable resources (Berger, 
1977:178). 
Not only will such ownership give them the legal basis from which they 
can negotiate with government and industry to ensure that any 
proposed developments are environmentally acceptable, it will also 
enable them to share in the benefits of economic development. 
Royalties from the development of non-renewable resources could be 
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used to modernize the native economy and to promote development of 
renewable resources. (Berger, 1977:179) 
Alaska's model robbed Natives of political control and was irremediably 
assimilationist, transforming hunters and gatherers into capitalists by destroying 
their land base ([d. : 177). The James Bay Agreement failed to offer Cree or Inuit 
sufficient political control or veto power over non-renewable resource development 
that threatened subsistence.3 
Berger assumed that political control of the territory could be retained as 
development and inmigration occurred through durational residency requirements 
(Berger, 1977:193). 
Berger's critique of indigenous needs both in Canada and in Alaska and his 
assessment of indigenous aspirations were accurate. In both places the local 
populations placed a primary value on their relationships to the land and its 
resources. Both village constituencies viewed with skepticism treaties (in the case of 
Canada) or settlements (in the case of Alaska) which purported to diminish their 
control over the land. Both the Northwest Territory and rural Alaska feared not only 
an increase in layers of government which they did not control but a systematic 
influx of non-Natives attracted by that same government. 
Each side of the border has aboriginal peoples whose isolated lives have been 
little affected by reserves and formalized Indian governments. Each group was 
threatened by population explosions, exploitation of non-renewable resources and 
increased control by non-indigenous governments. 
Given this clear and well-publicized articulation of aboriginal vision, coupled 
with detailed critiques of modern as well as historical attempts to deal with Northern 
peoples, one may ask what are the present circumstances of these same groups? To 
what extent do parallel opportunities and problems persist? 
- 1 1  -
By 1983, aboriginal peoples of Canada had secured what appeared on its face to 
be the dream of all aboriginal peoples - entrenchment of existing aboriginal rights, 
treaty rights and even prospectively negotiated land claims agreements into the 
repatriated constitution (Pentney, 1987).4 Thus, Indian affairs departed from a 
pattern established in North America of arrangements capable of being unilaterally 
altered by the federal government without negotiated consent by affected tribes. 
Alaska Native tribal rights advocates looked with envy at such an arrangement. Yet 
the dark shadow of prior government acts over newly achieved constitutional 
arrangements suggest that there is less apparent strength in the constitutional 
mandate than meets the eye. 
Overshadowing the new arrangement is the spectre that many rights have 
already been extinguished. The famous Calder case had predicted this. When a 
divided Canadian Supreme Court found in 1973 that Indian historic occupation and 
possession established Indian title as an independent legal right recognized, but not 
created by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, three members suggested that later 
governmental acts had extinguished such title. 
Within the realm of treaty rights, the federal government's long established 
duty to deal with Indians and lands reserved for Indians, confirmed in section 91(24) 
of the British North America Act, had been seriously affected by natural resource 
transfer agreements signed with the western provinces. These acts had arguably 
given provinces a direct role in selection of lands to be selected for the benefit of 
Indian bands, powerful leverage on the process. 
Indian tribal sovereignty had been seriously eroded by replacement of tribal 
authority with delegated authority by the often-amended Indian Act and by already 
implemented constitutional authority to apply provincial laws of general application 
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in education, criminal and civil law and many other areas to Indians on and off 
reserves (Hogg, 1985). 
That both federal and provincial ministers were a ware of the strength of their 
bargaining positions was evident in the series of constitutionally mandated First 
Minister Conferences when First Ministers refused to graft more detailed proposals of 
aboriginal groups into the constitution, especially judicially enforceable aboriginal 
rights to self-government. The federal government retreated from its desired role as 
advocate for the Indian positions and sought to broker a compromise. 
Some Canadian authorities argue that a federal political and judicial pattern 
had already been established to encourage provincial assumption ofresponsibility for 
Native services. Little room had been left for Indian governmental activity based on 
"inherent jurisdiction" (See Long and Boldt, 1988:6-7) 
Federal government has not yet developed a coherent policy on 
provincial responsibility for services to Indians; however, it is now 
adhering to the basic principle that it should cease to create special 
services of its own for Indians and, wherever feasible, should integrate 
Indians into the provincial framework of services. (Id., 9) 
This arrangement very well typifies the direction of federal policy in Alaska in 
the post-AN CSA era. Direct Bureau of Indian Affairs involvement in Native 
schooling gave way to regionally-based state school systems. Area offices of the 
Bureau closed. State organized boroughs and nonprofit regional corporations 
absorbed the responsibilities for delivering what had been (and were still on lower 48 
reservations) Indian programs. 
The ANILCA provision for state management of fish and game with a 
preference for traditional and customary subsistence left Alaska in the ironic position 
of having to discover and enforce village-defined tribal law (See Conn and Garber, 
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1989). In Canada unfettered off-reserve rights to hunt and fish set forth in treaties 
were not unilaterally restricted by provincial laws of general application because 
they affected Indians as Indians but were allowed by section 88 of the Indian Act (R. 
v. Dick, 1985). In both places, Natives confronted restrictions on their activities 
rooted in conservation practices as well as game limits and restrictions often 
inappropriate to the underlying sharing and distributive ethic of subsistence. 
While the federal government of Canada appears to agree that subsurface 
rights should be included in land settlements, the provincial position is colored by its 
desire to do little or nothing to curb resource exploitation in order to recoup revenues 
it spends on services to aboriginal peoples. The federal government has the principal 
obligation to fulfill indigenous expectations. But because the provinces possess the 
unoccupied Crown land, provincial ability to affect the negotiations is persistent. 
In Alaska, ANCSA has been structured to assure that natural resources would 
be taxed by the state when developed. Lands selected were placed in grids which 
assured access to non-Native lands for development. Native corporations have 
control over development of their own lands. But as pressures mount for corporate 
profits, pressures also mount to exploit resources known to exist. State and federal 
decisions decried by Berger became "Native decisions." Those institutional buffers 
which existed at the inception of AN CSA with Congressional distribution of surface 
estates to villages and subsurface estates to regional corporations dropped away 
when many regions merged the village and regional corporations. The Alaska lesson 
appears to be that even with confirmed Native control over resource exploitation, 
exploitation which may impair subsistence activity is directly affected by the 
economic imperatives of hard times in the villages and diminished federal and state 
spending in rural Alaska5 (See Conn, 1988). 
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The Territorial and Developmental Imperative 
A thesis of this paper has been that Indian policy in all countries is much 
affected by its political and historical context. This was true in "lower 48" 
developments and remains true in Canada and in Alaska. 
Two factors appear to be motivators. The first is the state/provincial desire to 
control land and resources. In Alaska, the claims settlement act was a necessary 
prerequisite to state land selection and the further division of state and federal land 
ownershp and managerial responsibilities. In Canada, the modern Indian law era 
was heavily influenced by more than recent court determinations that there were, in 
fact, aboriginal claims to settle. Despite a strong federal commitment to open 
negotiations on comprehensive claims by the Task Force to Review Comprehensive 
Claims Policy (See DIAND, 1985), the absence of large amounts of federally owned 
land slowed such negotiations except where a second factor came into play. That 
factor was the prospect that a large developmental project would be delayed by 
judicial proceedings. It had resulted in Quebec in the James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Agreement of 1975 and implementing legislation.6 
A strong developmental objective and a stock of land under federal control 
seemed to be twin prerequisites. In Canada they are available only in the territories. 
With the exception of James Bay in the provinces, aboriginal advocates found cause 
for hope only in the territories because negotiations were perceived to be largely 
bilateral and not tripartite. It was hoped that federal interest in development and 
federal ownership of land plus the relatively small non-Native populations would 
result in claims agreements that connected political control and land control in ways 
distinctly superior to that of the Alaska Settlement or the James Bay Agreement. 
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Tribal Models Compared 
In comparison with Alaska Natives, Canadian Inuit and Dene have developed 
several more sophisticated models of indigenous government as alternatives to mere 
participation in a federal territorial government, transformed into a province by 
devolution. For Inuit, division of the territory to retain their plurality is the 
preferred route with involvement in what is termed a consociational association of 
cultural communities, a second choice (Dacks, 1988:228-29). Alaska Natives who 
seek a reassertion of tribal rights have focused upon development of loose coalitions of 
villages, chief among these the Yupik Nation in Southwestern Alaska and the 
Tanana Chiefs of the Interior. Much political activity is village-centered. Yet until 
tensions and competition between non-profit Native regional corporations who 
receive funds and deliver services and villages who desire to control these decisions is 
resolved, Alaska, the state, will not confront serious tribal competitors to its 
centralized government. The differences in approaches between the NWT and 
Alaska exist because the core of Native legal sovereignty is village Alaska. Each 
village is a potential federal Indian tribe. However inefficient is the prospect of 200 
plus tribes, at this stage villages are endeavoring to prove their sovereignty both to 
outsiders through the courts and to residents by taking on increasing levels of 
governmental responsibilities. 
Village Alaska is actively seeking confirmation of its legal status as an Indian 
tribe in federal courts as a prelude to further political definition of its powers as a 
tribe (Miller, 1989). In N ative Village of Stevens v .  Alaska Management and Planning, the state supreme court has questioned whether Alaska Native villages 
are juridically tribes (Alaska State Supreme Court, 1988). This decision has serious 
implications for business and political initiatives of Alaska Native villages until it is 
overturned since it strips tribal officials of immunities from suit. However, village 
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goverments continue to function. Further, the federal courts have in two important 
cases found proof of Congressional acknowledgment of Alaska village tribal status 
through its application of the Indian Reorganization Act, the claims process and 
other legislation (Miller, 1989:20-25). The pertinent point for a comparative analysis 
is that Alaska villages may enjoy as leverage their original status as recognized 
tribes. However, they may be forced to seek further political delegation (or 
devolution) of authority from the federal and state governments in a manner similar 
to Canadian Indian bands when later questions of tribal powers are considered in the 
courts. This is true because the state, like many Canadian provinces, has a very 
significant role in daily village life. 
The Berger model, articulated in Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, 
stresses that comprehensive land claims should include development of a third order 
of government - a Denendeh Nation or Nunavuk Nation - controlled by the 
aboriginal population. But can it be wrested from federal negotiators even in the 
North west Territory? 
That vision of the future apparently has passed in 1989. A review of the 
Dene/Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement in Principle (1988) suggests a 
more modest return to categories of land ownership and co-management of wildlife 
resources as first defined in the James Bay Agre em en t. 7 
On the broad front of self-government, recent accords in British Columbia and 
Alberta are modeled on municipal governments, the same devolutionary model once 
criticized as an insufficient substitute for a tribal model based on judicially 
enforceable principles of inherent sovereignty. 
What has occurred? At least one factor is that the special exclusive leverage 
that Northern peoples and the federal government once had over territorial land 
rights and territorial destiny has been diminished by the proposed Meech Lake 
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Accord of 1987. If adopted as an amendment to the Constitution it would require unanimous provincial consent for admission of any new territory as a new province. This provides enormous provincial leverage over such matters as allocation of non­renewable resources between the new provinces and the nation as well as cultural autonomy. (See Erasmus, 1987.) At least as important is an increasing sense of pessimism among lawyers that jurists will discover and expand upon existing aboriginal constitutional rights in the provinces or the territory (Akhavan, ND). At least one other circumstance deserves mention because it is perhaps more important to an Alaskan observer than to a Canadian. The land claims period of Alaska gave rise to indirect representation of Native villages by urban uni ts such as the Alaska Federation of Natives. It left both federal and state representatives accustomed to dealing with near-at-hand and urban (or regional) representatives. These organizations continued to serve as lobbyists and, ultimately, as passthrough agencies for delivery of services. In Canada an Alaskan observer was struck by this same phenomenon at the First Minister Conferences. Once formed to represent rural and far-flung Native communities, it is hard for such secondary organizations to disband. It is also hard for villages to displace them in the halls of Congress or at the negotiating tables. Recent Canadian land rights agreements in principle mirror Alaska and James Bay models in their allocation of future negotiating or managerial authority to land claims settlement corporations and wildlife management boards. They may reflect another dangerous trend in detachment of power from Native communities. Certainly in Alaska villages, efforts to return the role of negotiator and program manager to villages from regional corporations have been slow to occur as both Native regional representatives and state/federal agencies resist this change in the name of efficiency, cooperation or job entitlement. 
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So where do the parallels in Alaska and Canada persist? In neither place is the 
vision of Justice Thomas Berger and his constituents achieved. In both places state 
and provincial hostility to a formula of land claims coupled with sovereign control of 
land and resource management holds sway, aided by federal disinterest in overly 
antagonizing provincial/state interests. In neither place is fear of a pending 
development project or federal ownership of public lands a sufficient prod for 
negotiations toward an amended or new settlement. In both places legal advocates 
will, in the next few years, attempt test cases to determine the scope of existing 
aboriginal rights to self-government, perhaps arguing that historical substitutes 
were never intended to extinguish inherent (and persistent) forms of community 
control. Other elements of the indigenous communities will settle into the business of 
land management and consultation. At this moment in time the positions of Alaska 
Natives and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples are similarly uncertain and favorable. 
Advocates and leaders on both sides of the border have much to do to protect their 
land and way oflife. 
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Footnotes 
1. This is not to say that Canadian Indian policy was uniform. As Sanders notes, 
"Half of the country was covered by treaties and half was not. The federal 
government for many years asserted a national policy by dismissing the significance 
of the treaties and rejecting claims to aboriginal rights on the others." (Sanders, 
1988:173 in Long and Boldt eds., 1988). 
2. Guerin v .  R ( 1985) 13 DLR (4th) 390, 400. Sanders (1987) writes on Guerin (at 
186): 
The fiduciary obligation of the Government of Canada arose because of 
the pre-existing Indian rights. Indian rights and the Crown's fiduciary 
obligation were confirmed, not created, by the provisions of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and the Indian Act. 
Remarkable as it may seem, the Guerin decision is the first clear 
Canadian decision that Indian rights arise out of the pre-existing 
indigenous legal order, and not from some common law doctrine of 
aboriginal title or by virtue of an affirming action by the colonial legal 
system. 
3. Berger's analysis is important: 
The James Bay Agreement, for example, requires, even in the case of 
Category 1 lands [land around villages], the Native people to permit 
subsurface owners to use the surface in the exercise of their rights. 
Indeed, they must permit surface use even to owners of subsurface 
rights adjacent to Category 1 lands. 
The subservience of the surface owner is often economic as well as legal, 
particularly in the North, because the short-term value in dollars of oil, 
gas or minerals lying beneath a tract ofland usually exceeds its short­
term value for hunting, fishing and trapping. (Berger, 1977:179) 
The James Bay Agreement includes guarantees to protect hunting, 
fishing and trapping rights. Are they not adequate? In the Agreement, 
the native people have exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping rights in 
Category 2 lands, and the Cree may select 25,000 square milres of such 
lands, but they have no special right of occupancy: the Government of 
Quebec may designate these lands for development purposes at any 
time, so long as the land used for development is replaced or 
compensation paid. Mining, seismic exploration and technical surveys 
are not, however, classified as development, so these activities may be 
carried out freely on Category 2 lands, without compensation or 
replacement ofland, even though such activity may interfere with the 
native people's hunting, fishing and trapping. Category 3 lands are 
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included in the public lands of the Province of Quebec: the native people 
have the right to hunt, fish and trap on them, and certain species of 
animals and birds may be reserved for their exclusive use. However, 
development of these lands may take place at any time without 
compensation in any form to native people. 
The land regime of the Agreement is buttressed by provisions for 
sustained levels of harvesting, a guaranteed minimum annual income 
for hunters and trappers, and an elaborate scheme for the participation 
of native people in game management and environmental protection. 
However, in nearly every case, their participation in this scheme is 
advisory and consultative. (Berger, 1977:178) 
4. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that "the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights are hereby recognized and affirmed. Aboriginal peoples 
are specifically identified as 'Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada."' 
To this was added "(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) 'treaty rights' 
includes rights that now exist by way of land rights agreements or may be so 
acquired." 
Section 25 of the Constitution Act provides that the "guarantee in this Charter 
of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate 
from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada including: 
a. any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation 
of October 7, 1763; and 
b. any rights or freedoms that (may have been acquired by the original peoples 
by way of land claims settlements) 'that now exist by way of land claims agreements 
or may be so acquired."' 
5. There are exceptions to this picture in Alaska. In cases where rural villages 
chose to take their executive order reserves in fee simple rather than participate 
further in the settlement act, villages have voted to retribalize the land by passing it 
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into the hands of their tribal government. However, their further attempts to place it 
in to a trust relationship with the Secretary of the Interior have been rejected. 
6. Even in this single example of provincial success one can argue that lingering 
responsibilities of the province of Que bee to expedite settlement of aboriginal claims 
left unsettled after boundary extensions of the province prompted the settlement 
reached. See Jeff Richstone, "Aboriginal Rights in Quebec," 170-175 in R. Kuppe Ed., 
2 Law and Anthropology (1987) International Academy of Comparative Law, 12th 
Congress, Session A.1 "The Aborigine in Comparative Law," Wien, Austria: 
WWGO-Verlag. 
7. While the Final Agreement does not affect the ability of participants to benefit 
in existing or future constitutional rights which may be applicable to them (3.1.3), it 
requires that they cede, release and surrender all their aboriginal claims to lands and 
waters as well as to Treaty 8 and Treaty 11 with respect to any matter provided in the 
agreement, as well as claims arising from any Imperial or Canadian legislation or 
Order-in-Council (3.1.9). Eligibility is based on descendency from designated Indian 
peoples who resided in the Mackenzie Basin on or before January 1, 1921 (4.1.1) as 
determined by a Central Enrollment Board (4.7.1). Canada will make a capital 
transfer payment to a designated Dene/Metis organization (8.1.1). Dene/Metis 
municipal lands within local government boundaries are assessable (2.1.1). 
Undeveloped land granted will not be taxed (11.4.1). Resource royalty sharing on a 
per capita basis will be negotiated but shall be limited to annual payments of 50 per 
cent of the first two million dollars received by the government and 10 per cent of any 
additional resource royalties (10.1.2). 
Dene/Metis have the right to harvest all species and populations of wildlife 
within the settlement area subject to limitations specified within the agreement 
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(13.4.1). Local councils will govern harvesting by any person within the limits 
prescribed by laws affecting wildlife. Privately held lands and lands subject to 
military or national security is exempted. Claims participants will be consulted 
when uses conflicting with harvesting objectives emerge with a right to arbitration 
( 13.4.14). While participants are expressly granted a right to give, trade, barter or 
sell all edible wildlife products harvested to other Dene/Metis and aboriginal persons, 
it may not be exercised for profit (13.4.17). Further, the government reserves the 
right to propose other legislation respecting human harvesting of wildlife with a 
right of consultation by the Dene/Metis ( 13.4.15). Harvest levels may be modified for 
conservation purposes by the Wildlife Management Board on which Dene/Metis 
participate (13.5.2). 
New local governments on Dene/Metis lands shall be established after 
negotiation and agreement between the Territorial Government and "a designated 
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